Don’t Ask Me About My Business: The Mafia’s Exploitation of the European Migration Crisis by Cappellazzo, Natalie
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 2 Article 4
5-24-2017
Don’t Ask Me About My Business: The Mafia’s
Exploitation of the European Migration Crisis
Natalie Cappellazzo
Boston College Law School, natalie.cappellazzo@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Human Rights
Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons,
International Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School.
For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Natalie Cappellazzo, Don’t Ask Me About My Business: The Mafia’s Exploitation of the European Migration Crisis, 40 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L.
Rev. 261 (2017),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol40/iss2/4
  
261 
DON’T ASK ME ABOUT MY BUSINESS:  
THE MAFIA’S EXPLOITATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS 
NATALIE CAPPELLAZZO* 
Abstract: Old meets new as the Italian mafia capitalizes on the European migra-
tion crisis. Beginning with the coordination of Mediterranean voyages and ending 
with the indefinite exploitation of refugees at mafia-run migrant camps, the mafia 
has found an opportunity to profit from the crisis at every step of the way. With no 
end to the constant influx of refugees in sight, and verging on a humanitarian cri-
sis within the camps’ walls, Italy faces a serious problem that requires a multifac-
eted solution. The Dublin regulations, which mandate registration and application 
for asylum in the first European Union country of entry, are in no small part tied 
to the situation in Italy. Not only does this system disproportionately burden bor-
der states and slow the asylum application process, it also traps refugees in proce-
dural limbo and allows corrupt individuals and organizations to profit from their 
quandary. In dire need of change in light of the refugee crisis, reforming Dublin 
has the capacity to loosen the mafia’s financial stronghold on the plight of mi-
grants while also safeguarding the fundamental human rights of refugees and giv-
ing them a better chance at the life they seek within Europe’s borders. 
INTRODUCTION 
The centuries-old problem of Italian organized crime has collided with 
the current refugee crisis, catalyzing the emergence of a lucrative new indus-
try: the trafficking and exploitation of migrants.1 Organized crime—more spe-
cifically the persistence and power of the Sicilian mafia—is nothing new.2 The 
Sicilian mafia rose to power in the early to mid-1800s and has since main-
tained its grip on Sicilian politics, economics, and society in many ways.3 The 
sudden influx of refugees into European waters and borders on the other hand, 
                                                                                                                           
 * Natalie Cappellazzo is the Executive Note Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
 1 See James Politi, Italy’s Mafia Learns to Profit from the Migration Crisis, FIN. TIMES (July 24, 
2015, 4:41 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0d0371d0-31f4-11e5-8873-775ba7c2ea3d.html#
axzz3xLvkkjau [https://perma.cc/JNE2-PXR7]. 
 2 See Paolo Buonanno, Ruben Durante, Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, On the Historical and 
Geographic Origins of the Sicilian Mafia (Feb. 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2009808 [https://perma.cc/DA4F-R6XK]. 
 3 See id.; Diego Gambetta, Mafia: The Price of Distrust, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING 
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 158, 159 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1990). 
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is a relatively recent phenomenon.4 The unprecedented volume and speed at 
which migrants are pouring into Europe has ushered in new business for the 
Mafia in the forms of human trafficking, drug dealing, prostitution, and above 
all, securing lucrative contracts for the service provision to and operation of 
migrant reception centers.5 
While each problematic in their own right, the combination of a healthy 
mafia and a refugee crisis poses new threats and challenges both to Italy do-
mestically and to the greater international community.6 The historical problems 
associated with mafia prosecution in Sicily, coupled with Europe’s inability to 
keep up with and respond to the ongoing refugee crisis, suggest that this is on-
ly the beginning of the mafia profiting off of and taking advantage of the ever-
increasing number of migrants.7 Nevertheless, as bleak as this forecast may be, 
finding a way to address this emerging problem is crucial to the preservation of 
international security, human rights, economic health, and political stability in 
Italy and beyond.8 
The objective of this Note is to explain the blending of these phenomena 
in order to underscore the need for an effective legal response. In highlighting 
the notion that mafia-led migrant exploitation is a multi-faceted problem, the 
Background section of this Note outlines the rise and persistence of the Sicili-
an mafia, and also describes the dynamics of the refugee crisis in the context of 
Southern Italy and Sicily. The Discussion then aims to explain how these two 
seemingly distinct problems have merged into one, suggesting that such a 
unique problem requires a response that not only weakens the mafia’s financial 
grip on the refugee crisis, but also safeguards the rights of the migrants and 
asylum seekers affected. It suggests a possible way forward via the Dublin 
regulations, and examines the conflicting outcomes of two European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) cases that pertain to Dublin’s application across the 
European Union (EU). 
Although this analysis acknowledges that mafia existence is by no means 
a novel issue, and that the migrant crisis itself is complex and overwhelming, 
the purpose of bringing the potent combination of these issues to light from a 
legal perspective is to highlight the pressing need for a solution to a growing 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Human Rights Watch, Europe’s Refugee Crisis: An Agenda for Action 12 (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/16/europes-refugee-crisis/agenda-action [https://perma.cc/3P6E-
UE67]. 
 5 See Eric Reguly, Refugee Crisis a Multibillion-Dollar Honeypot for Italian Mafia, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Jan. 12, 2016, 8:12 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/refugee-crisis-a-
multibillion-dollar-honeypot-for-italian-mafia/article27186445/ [https://perma.cc/N843-JAK4]. 
 6 See Alex Perry & Connie Agius, The New Mediterranean Mafia, MIGRANT REPORT: BACK 
BRIEF (June 12, 2015), http://migrantreport.org/migrants-and-the-new-mediterranean-mafia/ [https://
perma.cc/CX4P-5LE2]. 
 7 See id. 
 8 See id.; Reguly, supra note 5. 
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and severe international problem. The Analysis section argues that the current 
Dublin regulations are not only inherently flawed, but also that they have di-
rectly contributed to, exacerbated, and perpetuated the current situation in Ita-
ly. It advocates for meaningful reform of Dublin that not only adequately ad-
dresses the present problem of mafia exploitation of refugees, but also serves 
as a much-needed step towards a consistent, harmonized asylum policy across 
Europe that better safeguards the rights of asylum seekers, facilitates migrant 
integration, and promotes political, economic, and social stability across Eu-
rope when it is needed more than ever. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Roots and Rise of the Sicilian Mafia 
In order to understand current mafia activity as it pertains to refugees, it is 
useful to examine the environment in which the Sicilian mafia arose, as many 
of the conditions that facilitated the initial emergence of organized crime in 
Sicily are the very reason it still persists today.9 The two major events during 
the nineteenth century that catalyzed the rise of the Sicilian mafia are the dete-
rioration of feudalism in 1812, and the fall of the Bourbon reign in 1861.10 
In the early 1800s, most Sicilian land was under the control of feudal bar-
ons.11 However, rather than residing in their respective municipalities, most 
lords lived in the capital city of Palermo, which doubled as the political and 
economic hub of Sicily.12 Their land was rented to local proprietors who man-
aged production and often invested in the land themselves, until the feudal sys-
tem was abolished and all previously held feudal lands were officially trans-
ferred to the state.13 The power of the landlords was further weakened when 
the Bourbon monarchy collapsed and the island was annexed to form a unified 
Italian State.14 During these major institutional shifts, law enforcement fell by 
the wayside and the few valuable portions of land amongst the primarily im-
poverished countryside became susceptible to attacks by local bandits.15 As the 
state consistently failed to provide adequate public protection via local law 
enforcement, the demand for private protection skyrocketed.16 Simultaneously, 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See, e.g., Gambetta, supra note 3, at 158 (noting that the mafia has been able to sustain its pow-
er in southern Italy for over a century by creating and reinforcing a system of distrust). 
 10 Paolo Buonanno, Ruben Durante, Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, Poor Institutions, Rich 
Mines: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia 125 ECON. J. 175, 180 (2015). 
 11 See id. 
 12 Id. at 180–81. 
 13 Id. at 181. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id. The public perceived emerging Mafiosi as more capable of guaranteeing justice private-
ly than the state could publicly. See Gambetta, supra note 3, at 164–65. 
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the collapse of feudalism created a new class of former soldiers and convicts 
who had previously served as bodyguards to the local feudal administrators.17 
As groups of these individuals sprang up across the Sicilian countryside, their 
violent backgrounds, extensive local knowledge, and need for income naturally 
led to the commoditization of private protection.18 To this day, the degree of 
mafia presence and the extent of its activity remain largely dependent on the 
demand for protection and the state’s inability to provide it.19 
In fact, although the Mafia is typically thought to deal mainly in violence, 
its true primary commodity is protection.20 This allows for a diverse clientele 
and wide range of services, as the need for protection often extends to transac-
tions that would otherwise be perfectly legal.21 For instance, customers of the 
Sicilian mafia span both legal and illegal markets, and have included not only 
landowners, herdsmen, and peasants, but also olive and orange growers, politi-
cians, doctors, shopkeepers, smugglers, drug dealers, and weapons suppliers.22 
Further, because private protection is less often a one-time deal and more typi-
cally a long-term contract that establishes an ongoing relationship, the bond 
between provider and client is usually a lasting one.23 The deeply engrained 
nature of the mafia in Sicilian society therefore suggests that so long as the 
power of the mafia to guarantee protection supersedes that of the state, the de-
mand for mafia services will remain.24 
B. Mass Migration in the Mediterranean 
The overwhelming influx of refugees has reached crisis level in Europe, 
where over one million refugees arrived by December 2015.25 The vast majori-
ty of migrants have traveled and entered by sea, with the voyage from Libya to 
Italy being among the most hazardous migration routes.26 In 2015, over 3770 
migrants died, most of them crossing into Europe from North Africa.27 The 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Buonanno, supra note 10, at 181. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See id. 
 20 DIEGO GAMBETTA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA 2 (1993). 
 21 Id. at 3, 54 (“The mafia’s ‘consumers’ are quite cynical about it and know that mafia protection 
is often not a good but a lesser evil. . . . Yet, although the use of private protection may appear objec-
tionable in principle, in practice it is often a sensible option for certain individuals. . . . In both legal 
and illegal markets those who enlist mafiosi to sort out their disputes, to retrieve their stolen property, 
or to protect their cartels from free riders and competitors do not perceive that protection as bogus.”). 
 22 Id. at 54. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See id.; see also Gambetta, supra note 3, at 158 (explaining that the mafia has been able to 
sustain itself both intentionally and unintentionally for over a century). 
 25 Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts, BBC (Mar. 4, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 [https://perma.cc/7G56-F4JL]. 
 26 See id. 
 27 Id. 
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deadliest month was April, during which as many as 850 migrants died when a 
boat capsized off the coast of Libya.28 In 2015, over 130,000 migrants landed 
in Italy alone.29 In 2016, this figure climbed to 171,000, setting a new record 
for migrants reaching Italy by boat in a single year.30  
Italy has found itself at the center of the migrant crisis since the Arab 
Spring.31 As the Italian island of Lampedusa is the closest geographic point of 
Europe to Africa, refugees have now been arriving on Italian soil for years.32 
Although Italy initially treated refugee migration as a seasonal problem, as the 
vast majority of refugees had been making the voyage during the summer 
months, the recent escalation has signaled a much larger problem for the al-
ready overwhelmed state, which never found an initial way to efficiently pro-
cess and handle the growing number of asylum seekers.33 
Italy has been widely criticized for failing to properly identify migrants 
that arrive on its shores, particularly with regard to fingerprinting.34 Part of the 
problem stems from the mandate that refugees stay in the country in which 
they first submit an asylum request; to bypass this requirement and keep open 
the option to move elsewhere, many migrants refuse to have their fingerprints 
taken.35 Beyond the identification issue, there exists a contentious debate re-
garding the adequacy of Italy’s general handling of the crisis.36 Proponents of 
Italy’s efforts point to the “Mare Nostrum” operation: a yearlong program that 
required the Italian navy to rescue migrants traveling by boat in the Sicilian 
channel.37 This project is estimated to have saved approximately 190,000 peo-
ple.38 Additionally, the Italian government has decriminalized illegal immigra-
                                                                                                                           
 28 Id. 
 29 Angela Giuffrida, Italy: Thank Us for Refugee Help—Don’t Sue, LOCAL (Dec. 9, 2015, 2:50 
PM), http://www.thelocal.it/20151209/italy-slams-eu-over-refugee-crisis-criticism [https://perma.cc/
Z4QW-HYWS]. 
 30 See Patrick Kinglsey, 2016 Sets New Record for Asylum Seekers Reaching Italy by Boat, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2016, 7:27 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/28/2016-sets-
new-record-for-asylum-seekers-reaching-italy-by-boat [https://perma.cc/QNT4-T7H7]. 
 31 Giampiero Gramaglia, How Italy Is Still Struggling with the Refugee Crisis, EURS. WORLD 
(Oct. 16, 2015), http://europesworld.org/2015/10/26/how-italy-is-still-struggling-with-the-refugee-
crisis/#.Vpv8Q_EyOIc [https://perma.cc/DJ2N-E3KN]. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Giuffrida, supra note 29. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See id. For example, Italy’s Interior Minister Angelino Alfano stated that allowing the Europe-
an Commission to open proceedings against Italy would be “unreasonable,” and instead, the EU 
should thank Italy for the work it has done throughout the crisis. Id. 
 37 Nicholas Farrell, Welcome to Italy: This Is What a Real Immigration Crisis Looks Like, SPEC-
TATOR (June 20, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/06/the-invasion-of-italy/ [https://
perma.cc/YXJ8-P5CY]. 
 38 Id. 
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tion, meaning that migrants traveling by sea are not arrested upon their arrival 
on Italian land.39 
Setting the overarching policy debate aside, the statistics are a sobering 
reminder that there is no end in sight for Italy.40 The relatively small percent-
age of migrants staying in the welcome centers is the segment of the popula-
tion that actually applies for asylum: in 2014, 64,900 refugees applied, which 
is only one third of the number saved by the navy.41 From there, the judiciary 
was only able to decide on half of the applications, which is almost irrelevant 
in light of the fact that appeals are slow enough to allow even those who are 
rejected to stay in the country for years.42 Even a refugee with a rare deporta-
tion order does not have a difficult time staying; in 2014, Italy deported only 
6944 people.43 Italy’s close geographic proximity to North Africa, lack of con-
sistent identification procedures, and policies that facilitate both the arrival of 
migrants and their indefinite stay, solidify its position as a central fixture in the 
refugee crisis with little sign of impending change.44 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Smuggling, Service Contracts, and Subsidies:  
Making Them Offers They Can’t Refuse 
On March 21, 2011, a large Egyptian fishing boat approached the eastern 
coast of Sicily, stopping twelve nautical miles from the seaside town of Ri-
posto.45 The boat was carrying 190 migrants, primarily Egyptian and several 
Libyan, and nineteen crewmembers.46 At around 3:30 a.m., as two small fish-
ing boats were approaching the larger vessel with the anticipation of receiving 
the migrants, the Italian coast guard arrived and intervened, arresting the 
crewmembers and taking the migrants on board.47 
Before this particular instance in which the authorities intercepted the mi-
grants, operations of this nature had become routine thanks to a high-ranking 
Sicilian Mafioso’s decision to collaborate with a notorious North African 
smuggler.48 The investigation that culminated in this sting began five years 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Farrell, supra note 37. 
 44 See id.; see also Gramaglia, supra note 31 (noting that Italy should treat migration as a perma-
nent reality as opposed to a temporary problem). 
 45 Reguly, supra note 5; Lorenzo Tondo, How the Mafia Make Millions Out of the Plight of Mi-
grants, TIME (Jan. 18, 2016), http://time.com/4134503/mafia-millions-migrants/ [https://perma.cc/
Q8YQ-UDXQ]. 
 46 Reguly, supra note 5; Tondo, supra note 45. 
 47 Tondo, supra note 45. 
 48 Id. 
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prior when a migrant, upon his arrival in Italy, told police he overheard a 
crewman discussing a man who was organizing the smuggling of immigrants 
in Egypt.49 This man is Salvatore Greco, the sixty-one-year-old head of the 
Brunetto mafia clan of Riposto, Sicily.50 As it turns out, Greco had teamed up 
with Egyptian smuggler Mohamed Arafa Badawi and his son, Sayd, to formu-
late an arrangement in which Badawi and his son facilitated the refugee voy-
ages from Northern Africa to the Italian coast, and Greco supplied motorboats 
to bring the migrants to shore, hide them, and secure their transportation to 
northern Europe.51 
In attempting to assess just how profitable migrant smuggling is, Italian 
prosecutors estimate that the mafia has tapped into a multi-billion dollar busi-
ness.52 In the scheme described above, Badawi charged each migrant between 
three and six thousand dollars for the voyage from North Africa to Sicily, 
meaning that a single journey with two hundred migrants on board could gen-
erate at least $600,000.53 From a financial standpoint, the arrangement is al-
most entirely risk-free because the money is collected upfront and the smug-
glers, who have already been paid, are largely unconcerned with whether the 
boats actually make it to their destination.54 
The profits certainly do not stop at the shoreline; the mafia has found 
ways to cash in on the plight of the refugees every step of the way, including 
housing them upon arrival in Italy and securing additional transportation to 
northern Europe, where the prospect of employment is compelling for many of 
the migrants.55 Yet the most lucrative aspect of the refugee crisis is likely the 
management of migrant centers across Italy.56 Sicily alone is home to six gov-
                                                                                                                           
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. On the night of the Italian intervention, both Greco and Badawi fled the scene by boat. Id. 
Greco and his son Massimo were arrested three days later and sentenced to five years in prison for 
conspiracy and facilitation of illegal immigration, while Badawi was murdered in Egypt in 2012 after 
the Egyptian government refused to extradite him to Italy. Id. Police believe he was killed by fellow 
collaborators for not sharing profits. Id. 
 52 See Reguly, supra note 5 (“Prosecutors say the Sicilian Mafia, known as the Cosa Nostra, and 
possibly other Italian Mafia groups must consider the Mediterranean refugee crisis manna from heav-
en. ‘Behind the smugglers, there is a multibillion-dollar business—and that of course attracts the Ma-
fia,’ said Maurizio Scalia, a prosecutor in the Sicilian capital, Palermo, who is investigating smug-
gling networks and sharing his findings with European investigators.”). 
 53 Reguly, supra note 5. As a result of the arrests and convictions that followed the interception of 
the smuggling voyage, law enforcement officials in Sicily confirmed that Greco and Badawi were 
involved in a vast network of smugglers that included money men and safe houses in Italy, and that 
they had carried out five to six trips prior to being caught. Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Rick Noack, For Rome’s Mafia, More Refugees Means More Money, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/04/for-romes-mafia-more-
refugees-means-more-money/ [https://perma.cc/K4RC-YT8Z]; Reguly, supra note 5. Rome is current-
ly embroiled in a similar scandal of its own, in which mafia members bribed high-ranking government 
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ernment-funded camps.57 When corrupt government officials award contracts 
to mafia-controlled companies to provide food, clothing, and medicine to the 
migrant camps, the mafia provides cheaper services to the centers than other 
commercial companies would, profiting from the difference.58 
These service contracts are valuable, especially at Mineo, one of the largest 
migrant centers in Sicily that houses four thousand refugees.59 The government 
subsidizes Mineo’s operation by providing forty euros per day for each adult and 
eighty euros per day for each child, which is intended to cover food, shelter, ed-
ucation, and general upkeep.60 This amounts to an annual budget of €98 million 
for Mineo alone.61 Because the refugees at Mineo are in the long process of 
waiting for their asylum applications to be processed, and the flow of migrants 
into the centers is seemingly endless as the refugee crisis marches on, there ap-
pears to be no end in sight as the mafia continues to cash in on the camps.62 
B. More Migrants, More Money, More Problems 
As investigations swirl around the legality of the operation and service 
provision contracts for the migrant centers, additional problems are simmering 
just below the surface: poor living conditions, human rights violations, and 
criminal activity inside the camps’ walls.63 At Mineo, reports of exploitation 
and abuse have surfaced through testimonies gathered outside of the camp, 
which tell of scarce food supplies, overcrowded sleeping areas, lack of health 
services, withheld daily allowances, bullying, and intimidation.64 Located in 
rural Sicily, the facility was formerly used as a residential complex for U.S. 
military personnel.65 It is presently surrounded by a twelve-foot high fence and 
secured by armed guards at the entrance, which, coupled with the atmosphere 
                                                                                                                           
officials in order to secure contracts to manage refugee accommodation, as well as Rome’s parks and 
waste collection services. Id. In a wiretapped phone call, with regard to the refugee crisis, suspected 
collaborator Salvatore Buzzi stated that “drug trafficking earns less” than the “immigration business.” 
Id. He further stated: “We closed this year with turnover of [$50 million], but . . . our profits all came 
from the gypsies, the housing emergency and the immigrants . . . .” Id. (alterations in original). 
 57 Tondo, supra note 45. 
 58 Id.; see Reguly, supra note 5. 
 59 Tondo, supra note 45. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id.; Reguly, supra note 5. 
 63 See Niccolo Zancan, Sicilian Mafia Cashes in on Desperate Immigrants, STAMPA (Mar. 13, 
2015), http://www.lastampa.it/2015/03/24/esteri/lastampa-in-english/sicilian-mafia-cashes-in-on-
desperate-immigrants-LzOAbd4ybfpKFge9CeAUiO/pagina.html [https://perma.cc/977J-ELDL]. 
 64 Gianluca Mezzofiore, Mediterranean Migrants Meet the Mafia at Sicily’s Kafkaesque Mineo 
Camp, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2015, 11:13 AM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sicily-mediterranean-
migrants-exploited-lucrative-business-huge-mineo-camp-1498737 [https://perma.cc/K8VE-P3MY]. 
 65 Id. 
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of fear and intimidation, has generated criticism that the center is reminiscent 
of a concentration camp.66 
The mafia’s lucrative tactics of skimping on the provision of services is 
readily apparent in the daily lives of the migrants living in the camps.67 For the 
many migrants at Mineo, eating a steady diet of low-quality pasta and rice, 
wearing the same clothes since their arrival in Italy, and sharing a small room 
with six to eight people and no ventilation are all symptoms of the same prob-
lem of mafia operation.68 Often the small daily allowance of €2.50, intended to 
be used to purchase SIM cards, never reaches the migrants because the admin-
istrators frequently pocket the money and give out cigarettes instead.69 If the 
allowance actually reaches the migrants, it does so in the form of an electronic 
card that can only be used at the center’s store, again benefitting the corrupt 
service providers.70 
The director of the center claims that frustration and unrest can be at-
tributed to the long asylum application process, and not to the quality of life 
within the camp’s walls.71 Ironically, this application process also funnels prof-
its to the mafia’s Mineo scheme.72 Not only does the long duration of the pro-
cess ensure that migrants stay long enough for a steady stream of government 
subsidies to flow into mafia pockets, but there is also money to be made in 
charging the migrants for rides back and forth to Catania, where asylum seek-
ers must go to fill out all of the necessary paperwork.73 Further contributing to 
instability and unrest at Mineo is the underlying threat of riots.74 Perhaps un-
surprising in light of the living conditions at the center, eleven riots broke out 
at Mineo in 2014 alone.75 There is also an added dimension of racism fueling 
the tension between administrators and inhabitants; in one instance, a group of 
migrants set fire to a Red Cross tent after Red Cross members used racial slurs 
towards one of the refugees.76 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. (“[Activist Alfonso] Di Stefano, who accuses the [asylum] commission of steering clear of 
the centre for fear of riots, calls Mineo ‘the biggest segregation camp in Europe’ and explains that 
Italian authorities have imposed a regime of fear and intimidation ‘akin to that used in the Nazi con-
centration camp’ with kapos, or privileged insiders, heading each community of migrants, controlling 
every aspect of their lives.”). 
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Perry & Agius, supra note 6. 
 71 Mezzofiore, supra note 64. Sebastiano Maccarrone, the director of Mineo, claims it is a “re-
spectable centre,” stating, “[t]he migrants don’t need money, we provide them with everything they 
need to live in the camp. The constant presence of police guarantees that law and order is respect-
ed. . . . People are frustrated because they have to wait at least 12 months to get a response.” Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id.; see Zancan, supra note 63. 
 74 See Mezzofiore, supra note 64. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
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In addition to creating a vicious cycle of poverty and unrest, the centers 
also breed illegal activity.77 Receiving little to no daily allowance, migrants 
resort to lining up at 7:00 a.m. to board trucks that will take them to work on 
the surrounding orange and tomato fields.78 The arrangement is risky because 
it is illegal and all money is exchanged completely under the table, and the 
migrants are only paid between one and three euros per hour for their labor.79 
The mafia has also entrusted the migrants with drug dealing within the center 
and in nearby towns, and often forces the migrant women into prostitution.80 It 
therefore goes without saying that Mineo and other mafia-run migrant centers 
have become breeding grounds for instability, illicit activity, and human rights 
violations.81 Although Italy’s parliament is coming to this realization, it re-
mains to be seen whether action will follow, and how much more the mafia 
stands to gain in the meantime.82 
C. Sicily’s Solution: International Law, Domestic  
Proceedings, or Something Else 
The collision of the mafia and the migrant crisis has ushered in a new 
wave of problems related to the exploitation of refugees.83 Not only is there an 
overarching problem of mafia operation with regard to human trafficking and 
illegally securing contracts to operate migrant centers, but also the tangential, 
ground-level issues of growing poverty, rumblings of revolt, unbearable living 
conditions, drug pushing, and prostitution.84 The solution, therefore, must have 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See id. 
 78 Id.; Perry & Agius, supra note 6; Zancan, supra note 63. 
 79 Zancan, supra note 63. 
 80 Tondo, supra note 45; Zancan, supra note 63. Prostitution has become particularly problematic 
both in and around the camps. See Zancan, supra note 63 (“The first thing a visitor is asked when 
arriving at the gates to Europe’s largest center for asylum seekers is: ‘Do you want one girl, or two?’ 
It is not a misunderstanding between the visitor and the four Eritrean migrants standing in the dark in 
front of Italian army trucks . . . . There are girls for sale on side streets, or are sometimes brought into 
the city where they can earn more.”). 
 81 See Zancan, supra note 63; see also Mark Townsend, Child Migrants in Sicily Must Overcome 
One Last Obstacle—the Mafia, GUARDIAN: OBSERVER (July 23, 2016, 7:06 PM), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/23/child-migrants-in-sicily-must-overcome-mafia-obstacle [https://
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humanitarian time bomb’ and demanded it be closed.”). 
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the capacity to curtail the mafia’s windfalls while simultaneously safeguarding 
both the legal protections and human rights of the migrants.85 
Certain documents in the realm of international law aim to articulate the 
rights of refugees, or explain what constitutes human rights and their corre-
sponding violations.86 But do these mechanisms adequately address the eco-
nomic component of this problem?87 Can identifying and safeguarding the 
rights of the migrants translate to weakening the financial stronghold of the 
mafia?88 On the other hand, Italian prosecutors believe that decades of experi-
ence have made them the best equipped to handle the mafia; but will the inves-
tigation and subsequent prosecution of top Mafiosi also guarantee the safety 
and well-being of the refugee populations affected?89 
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Enter the Dublin regulations: initially coming into force in the Irish capi-
tal in 1990 as the Dublin Convention, the law has been amended several times 
since in order to address subsequent problems.90 The current version—known 
as Dublin III—has the legal status of a regulation and is binding upon member 
nations, which include the EU in its entirety plus Iceland, Lichtenstein, Nor-
way, and Switzerland.91 The Dublin regulations function as the portion of EU 
law that dictates which member states are charged with processing the asylum 
requests of refugees.92 The general rule established by the Dublin regulations 
stipulates that the country through which the asylum seeker first enters the un-
ion is tasked with taking fingerprints and processing the asylum application.93 
Because the country of entry has already assumed these responsibilities, mi-
grants who move further into Europe are sent back to their respective respon-
sible nations in what are known as Dublin transfers.94 
The rationale behind the implementation of this scheme is an attempt to 
ensure that only one country is responsible for processing each individual asy-
lum seeker’s application.95 This policy, in theory, discourages migrants from 
moving across multiple countries to present their cases, or “asylum-
shopping.”96 It was also intended to prevent situations where migrants simply 
“orbit” around the EU without any single country having accountability for 
their cases.97 To these ends, the Dublin system also includes the Eurodac data-
base, which stores the fingerprints of all asylum seekers who complete the reg-
istration process upon arrival in the European Economic Area (EEA): the EU, 
plus Lichtenstein, Iceland, and Norway.98 This archive allows immigration au-
thorities across Europe to determine where an individual asylum-seeker has 
applied, and whether applications have been lodged in multiple countries.99 
Perhaps the most contentious piece of the Dublin legislation is the re-
quirement that asylum seekers be sent back to the country in which they first 
filed an application, which is typically the country through which they first 
entered the EEA.100 Several Grand Chamber judgments from the ECtHR illus-
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trate how the Dublin transfers operate in practice, and also highlight some of 
the complications and difficulties that arise from the send back provision.101 
D. Dublin Decisions and the State of the “Send Back” Provision 
1. Suspension of Transfers to Greece in the Wake of M.S.S. 
In early 2008, Afghan national M.S.S. left Kabul and travelled to Greece 
via Iran and Turkey.102 After entering the EU through Greece, he arrived in 
Belgium on February 10, 2009 and subsequently applied for asylum there.103 
Pursuant to the Dublin regulations, the Belgian Aliens Office submitted a re-
quest to Greece to take responsibility for processing M.S.S.’s request for asy-
lum.104 While his case was pending, the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees wrote a letter to the Belgian Minister for Migration and Asylum 
Policy, criticizing the process and recommending that all transfers to Greece be 
suspended in light of deficiencies in Greece’s asylum procedure and the condi-
tions of reception of migrants in Greece.105 Despite this recommendation, and 
without any acknowledgement from Greek officials, the Belgian immigration 
authorities ordered M.S.S. back to Greece in May of 2009, arguing that Bel-
gium was not responsible for handling M.S.S.’s case, and that they believed 
that Greece would meet its obligations in processing the case.106 
Upon lodging an appeal with the Aliens Appeals Board, M.S.S. argued 
that if returned to Greece he would face the risk of detention in appalling con-
ditions, that there were significant deficiencies in the Greek asylum system, 
and that he feared being sent back to Afghanistan without a proper examina-
tion of his reasons for leaving, which included his escape from a Taliban mur-
der attempt.107 His application was again rejected, and he was transferred to 
Greece on June 15, 2009.108 When he arrived at Athens International Airport, 
he was detained in an adjacent building where he was locked in a small area 
with twenty other detainees who had restricted toilet access, could not leave 
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for fresh air, were given very little food, and had to sleep either on the floor or 
on dirty mattresses.109 Once he was released with an asylum seeker’s card on 
June 18, he lived on the streets with no subsistence.110 After attempting to 
leave Greece with a fake identification card, he was arrested and returned to 
the detention center next to the airport, where he was allegedly beaten by the 
police.111 Upon his release one week later, he returned to the streets where he 
occasionally received aid from the local church and residents, and although 
steps were allegedly taken to find him accommodation, he was never offered 
any housing.112 
The portion of this case that pertains to the present discussion is the ap-
plicant’s complaint that returning him to Greece, where he was subjected to 
deplorable detention conditions and living conditions, constituted a violation 
of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.113 He not only al-
leged that the situation in Greece amounted to a violation of the prohibition 
against inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, but also that Belgium 
had committed a violation in having exposed him to such conditions by send-
ing him back.114 
In rendering its decision, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR acknowl-
edged the burden the refugee crisis has placed on EU border states, particularly 
with regard to receiving migrants and asylum seekers at major international 
airports.115 However, the court found that this burden ultimately does not ab-
solve Greece of its obligations under Article 3.116 The court noted that the 
complaint of the widespread practice of Greek authorities detaining asylum 
seekers without explanation, as well as the allegations concerning unsanitary 
living conditions and overcrowding, were corroborated by the reports of wit-
nesses, international organizations, the European Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.117 
The court ultimately found that the conditions in Greece were unaccepta-
ble, that the applicant’s detention was anxiety-inducing and undoubtedly had a 
profound impact on his sense of dignity, and that as an asylum-seeker, he was 
particularly vulnerable in light of his migration and traumatic experiences.118 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 271. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See id. at 306; see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights] (“No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”). 
 114 See M.S.S., 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 306. 
 115 See id. at 309–10. 
 116 Id. at 310. 
 117 Id. at 310–12. 
 118 Id. at 311–12. 
2017] The Mafia’s Exploitation of the Migrant Crisis 275 
Taken together, the court held that these circumstances amounted to a violation 
of Article 3.119 Additionally, the court found that because the facts regarding 
the conditions in Greece were well known and ascertainable from a number of 
sources, Belgium was also in violation of Article 3 in light of the Belgian au-
thorities’ decision to knowingly expose him to living conditions that amounted 
to degrading treatment.120 Following this judgment, all Dublin transfers from 
other member states to Greece were suspended, and despite mounting EU 
pressure on Greece to accept Dublin returns, they have remained frozen ever 
since.121 Pursuant to the plan the European Commission announced in Decem-
ber 2016, member states had the option to send migrants back to Greece start-
ing in mid-March of 2017.122 Although gaining some traction in countries such 
as Germany, which announced its decision to begin returning arriving asylum 
seekers to Greece, the commission’s recommendation has been widely criti-
cized in light of the unimproved and unsafe situation in Greece by the Greek 
government, non-governmental organizations, human rights organizations, and 
refugees themselves.123 This criticism culminated in the Greek migration min-
ister’s announcement at the end of March 2017 that Greece cannot, and will 
not, resume acceptance of returned refugees.124 
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2. Refusal to Extend Blanket Suspension to Italy Following Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland 
While the situation in Greece has been alleviated by an ECtHR judgment, 
Italy has not had similar success.125 In July 2011, a family of seven Afghani 
nationals traveled by boat from Turkey to Italy, landing on the coast of Ca-
labria on July 16.126 After supplying false identities, the family members had 
their photographs and fingerprints taken pursuant to the Eurodac identification 
procedure.127 They were detained for ten days in a reception facility, where 
their true identities were established, and then transferred to another facility.128 
The applicants left the Italian facility without permission on July 28, traveled 
to Austria, and registered in the Eurodac system for a second time.129 The 
family submitted an application for asylum that was ultimately rejected, and 
the Austrian authorities requested that Italy reassume responsibility for the ap-
plicants.130 Although the request was accepted and the applicants were, in theo-
ry, supposed to return to Italy, the family travelled to Switzerland and lodged 
another asylum application.131 There, they were interviewed by the Federal 
Migration Office, which decided not to move forward in processing the case 
and deemed Italy the appropriate member state to do so.132 
After several additional unsuccessful attempts to have their application 
processed in Switzerland, the applicants requested an interim measure from the 
ECtHR suspending their deportation.133 The applicants alleged in relevant part 
that if they were returned to Italy without guarantees regarding their care, they 
would face inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 in light of the 
conditions that asylum seekers faced in Italy.134 The family also alleged that 
their return to Italy would deprive them of their right to respect for private and 
family life under Article 8, as they had no connections to Italy and did not speak 
Italian, and further, that the Swiss authorities were in violation of Article 13 in 
not giving due consideration to their personal circumstances as a family.135 
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In evaluating the family’s claim pursuant to Article 3, the court acknowl-
edged that both the reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe 
pointed to various failings in Italy’s reception of asylum seekers, noting in par-
ticular the wide discrepancy between the number of asylum applications and 
the number of available spaces in the reception facilities.136 Although the court 
was aware of the fact that living conditions in the facilities were problematic, it 
specifically noted that the reports did not include mention of widespread vio-
lence or completely deplorable conditions, and that the Italian authorities had 
been making efforts to improve reception conditions.137 
In rendering its decision, much of the court’s attention was devoted to the 
fact that the applicants involved in the present case were children belonging to 
a family.138 The court emphasized the notion that asylum seekers are entitled to 
special protection under Article 3 as a vulnerable population group, and that 
special protection is particularly important where children are concerned, even 
if accompanied by parents.139 The court found that in light of the risk that asy-
lum seekers sent back to Italy could be left without accommodation or ac-
commodated in overcrowded facilities with poor living conditions, the Swiss 
authorities had an obligation to ensure that if returned, the Italian authorities 
could guarantee that the family would be placed in facilities and conditions 
appropriate for the children, and that the family would not be separated.140 
Thus, the court held that sending the family back to Italy without these assur-
ances would constitute an Article 3 violation.141 
Unlike the outcome in M.S.S. v. Belgium, the court did not find in Tarak-
hel v. Switzerland that the situation in Italy with regard to migrant reception 
warranted a general suspension of all Dublin transfers back to Italy.142 The 
judgment therefore largely leaves the decision of whether or not to undertake a 
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Dublin transfer to Italy in the hands of member states.143 Given the various 
legal repercussions that a state may be exposed to as a result of requesting 
Dublin transfers and the procedure through which the authorities conduct 
them, the significant amount of state discretion in Dublin transfers to Italy after 
Tarakhel ultimately raises several unanswered questions.144 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Deconstructing Dublin 
The current system established under the Dublin regulations is unsustain-
able.145 Although this portion of EU law was designed to harmonize asylum 
policy and procedure across the EEA, Dublin III is problematic in its inability 
to handle the present refugee crisis, disproportionate impact on particular 
member states that fall on Europe’s borders, hindrance to permanent settlement 
and integration, and failure to take into account the circumstances in Italy that 
have given rise to the mafia’s stronghold on asylum seekers.146 While the solu-
tion to the problem of mafia exploitation of migrants may very well lie in re-
forming Dublin, it is necessary to first understand where exactly the Dublin 
regulations have fallen short.147 
The most recently amended version of the Dublin regulations entered into 
force in January 2014.148 At the time of the consultations over the latest round 
of changes, it would have been difficult to forecast the speed at which the ref-
ugee crisis would accelerate in the period that followed.149 For example, in 
2012, the number of asylum applicants hovered around 330,000.150 In the 
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fourth quarter of 2015 alone, Europe was bombarded with 426,000 applica-
tions.151 Unsurprisingly, 2015 set the record for highest number of asylum ap-
plications in any single year with 1.3 million refugees applying for asylum 
across the EU.152 Although 2016 saw a reduction in the total number of asylum 
seekers entering the EU, the backlog of pending applications surpassed one 
million and is expected to continue growing.153 From a sheer numbers perspec-
tive, the initial Dublin regulations were not designed to handle this volume of 
asylum applications and even the various rounds of amendments cannot keep 
up with complexities that have since arisen due to the multitude of applications 
ushered in by the refugee crisis.154 
Even more problematic is the fact that the burden associated with the high 
volume of applications is not spread out evenly across the EU.155 Because the 
Dublin system mandates that the member state responsible for processing an 
asylum seeker’s application be the country through which the individual first 
entered Europe, member states that happen to be popular entry points, namely 
borders, are disproportionately affected by the regulations.156 Not only do these 
states have the task of processing an overwhelming number of applications, 
but they also must be able to sustain a growing population.157 Border countries 
such as Greece and Italy are already constrained in terms of resources, so their 
ability to process applications swiftly and ensure that asylum seekers have 
their basic needs met has become increasingly unlikely, if not already com-
pletely infeasible.158 
Although Dublin was intended to ensure consistent application of a uni-
form asylum policy throughout the EU, disparities in reception centers and 
resource availability among member nations have threatened this goal.159 Vast 
differences in living standards, job opportunities, and access to government 
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services incentivize migrants to attempt to move further into Europe.160 With a 
high national unemployment rate following the financial crisis and a limited 
welfare system, asylum seekers who land in Italy face difficulty in securing, at 
best, a minimum level of income and basic housing.161 Norway, on the other 
hand, boasts an organized system of 130 reception centers and low unemploy-
ment rates stemming from its healthy oil economy.162 When asylum seekers are 
accepted, they complete a two-year comprehensive introductory program that 
includes language lessons and job training, receive extensive welfare benefits 
plus an additional salary, and are afforded a wide range of social rights.163 
Aware of this type of glaring discrepancy from country-to-country, many 
migrants attempt to land in Italy unnoticed by immigration authorities in an 
effort to evade the registration and fingerprinting process.164 If successful, they 
can move on to other European countries with better reception conditions and 
welfare systems.165 If unsuccessful, the migrants are effectively tied to Italy, 
and the risk of leaving corresponds to a risk of wasting time and valuable re-
sources if ultimately sent back via a Dublin transfer.166 This places asylum 
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seekers in a constant state of limbo.167 Uncertain as to their final destinations 
and whether they will remain in Italy for good, migrants have little incentive to 
integrate into Italian society, learn the language, secure housing, or seek long-
term employment.168 This looming uncertainty and unrest across European coun-
tries, especially in Italy, breeds instability and undermines the entire European 
asylum regime under Dublin.169 The reception systems, welfare schemes, and 
government service programs of various member nations are deeply entrenched 
in national politics and thus unlikely to undergo any radical changes in the near 
future.170 This is especially true in border countries such as Italy where re-
sources are already spread thin.171 Therefore, harmony in asylum policy and 
increased migrant integration can only be achieved if Dublin adapts according-
ly, taking into consideration the critical differences among member nations that 
impact asylum procedure at the national level.172 
This point raises another major criticism of Dublin that goes to the heart 
of the present analysis: the Dublin system, and more specifically the judgments 
of the ECtHR pertaining to Dublin, does not account for the present (and 
worsening) situation in Italy that has resulted from the relatively recent phe-
nomenon of mafia exploitation.173 Following M.S.S. v. Belgium, all Dublin 
transfers via the send back provision were suspended.174 In rendering the deci-
sion that catalyzed this suspension, the court acknowledged that Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights does not require that member 
states secure a certain standard of living for refugees through the provision of 
financial assistance.175 However, the court found that M.S.S.’s circumstances 
were characterized by extreme poverty, an inability to meet his basic needs of 
food, hygiene, and housing, and living in a constant state of fear of being at-
tacked or robbed.176 On the contrary, in Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the court did 
not find that the conditions in Italy merited a general suspension of transfers, 
as the situation at that time was not comparable to that in Greece.177 
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Whether or not this was the correct outcome at the time of the decision in 
2014—which is certainly debatable—it definitely does not hold true today.178 
In rendering its decision regarding the conditions in Italy, the court relied pri-
marily upon reports from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, both pub-
lished in 2012.179 The present reality is that Italy is unfit for returns.180 Given 
the long delays in the processing of asylum applications, exploitation of mi-
grants, and egregious human rights problems within the centers, all perpetuat-
ed by the mafia, sending asylum seekers back to Italy through Dublin transfers 
today almost certainly constitutes a violation of Article 3, akin to the violation 
found in M.S.S. v. Belgium.181 
B. Reforming Dublin: A Solution the Mafia Cannot Afford 
The mafia’s ability to sustain its lucrative business of profiting off of mi-
grants directly corresponds to Dublin’s flaws.182 The current system established 
under Dublin effectively traps refugees in Italy upon arrival by mandating first-
entry registration and asylum application.183 Further, Dublin keeps the migrants 
there indefinitely by overburdening Italy with applications, thereby clogging up 
the pipeline and slowing down the whole process, which essentially gives the 
mafia more time and opportunities to make money.184 Finally, Dublin ensures 
that even if migrants do manage to escape from the mafia by leaving Italy, they 
are sent right back via Dublin’s option to return to the first point of entry.185 
1. Eliminate the First Country of Entry Asylum Application Requirement 
As a starting point, the requirement that asylum seekers must apply for 
asylum in the country through which they first entered the European Union 
should be abandoned.186 This does not necessarily require an overhaul of the 
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Eurodac registration and fingerprinting system in place; on the contrary, leav-
ing this system intact will allow member states to continue to access a single, 
centralized database of information, and also promotes transparency and ac-
countability by ideally collecting reliable data about all refugees entering Eu-
rope and ensuring that people do not fall through the cracks during the initial 
phase of asylum proceedings.187 The crucial difference, however, should be 
that the registration process, which includes the taking of photographs and fin-
gerprinting, is kept separate from the application process.188 In this ideal sce-
nario, migrants would be registered upon entry into Europe, but would then 
have the freedom to move elsewhere and choose where to lodge a single asy-
lum application, thus streamlining the process and simultaneously giving asy-
lum seekers increased autonomy over their ultimate place of residence.189 
This reform would also deal a major blow to the mafia.190 The primary 
reason the mafia has been able to make millions of dollars off of the refugee 
crisis is the sheer volume of migrants living in Italy, primarily in the mafia-
controlled centers.191 Because the government essentially pays the mafia to 
take care of the migrants on a per-person basis, fewer people becoming trapped 
in the camps upon arrival means fewer daily allowances the mafia can with-
hold, and fewer services they can contract to deliver and then provide sparing-
ly.192 Simply put, if the migrant centers aren’t full, the mafia loses money.193 
Further, because this change would result in a more even distribution of 
asylum applications across the EU, Italy would no longer be overburdened 
with a disproportionate amount of applications to process.194 Consequently, the 
time the migrants spend in limbo at the camps would be severely reduced.195 
This is another way to curtail mafia proceeds, as the current nationwide delays 
in application processing have allowed the mafia to profit off of each individu-
al asylum applicant for a prolonged period of time.196 Additionally, the groups 
of migrants already in the camps would ideally have their applications pro-
cessed more quickly.197 
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2. Prohibit or Suspend All Dublin Transfers to Italy 
Secondly, the portion of the Dublin regulations that allows member na-
tions to send asylum seekers back to the country through which they initially 
entered the EU should be eliminated, or at the very least, all Dublin transfers to 
Italy should be suspended in the same manner as transfers to Greece were sus-
pended following the ECtHR’s judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium.198 Again, the 
current scheme places a disproportionate burden upon states that happen to fall 
on Europe’s borders.199 The present system is unsustainable, as many asylum 
seekers are being sent back to the very countries where resources, welfare ser-
vices, and spaces in reception centers are most severely limited.200 
It has become unavoidably clear that living conditions in the mafia-
controlled reception centers are poor enough to warrant this suspension.201 
While this may not have been the case at the time the ECtHR decided Tarak-
hel, it certainly is now.202 Ongoing economic exploitation of vulnerable groups 
of refugees, coupled with systematic human rights abuses in the centers, un-
doubtedly translates to a violation of Article 3 on the part of any country at-
tempting to send asylum seekers back to Italy.203 If another case involving a 
Dublin transfer reaches the ECtHR prior to an amendment or a complete over-
haul of Dublin, the court should wholeheartedly support a general prohibition 
of this nature.204 Again, this would reduce mafia windfalls significantly, as Ita-
ly has been the recipient of the largest number of incoming transfer requests 
from other member nations.205 Ensuring that asylum seekers do not end up back 
in the reception centers directly correlates to less revenue in mafia pockets.206 
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Reforming the Dublin regulations in these two crucial ways is not only in 
the best interest of the ever-increasing population of migrants and refugees 
seeking asylum in Europe, but it is also essential to curtailing mafia windfalls 
and ultimately hindering predatory mafia activity moving forward.207 
CONCLUSION 
While it is unlikely that any single solution will bring a swift demise to a 
centuries-old institution such as the mafia while simultaneously solving the 
complex problems that have developed in the wake of the ongoing refugee cri-
sis, reforming the Dublin regulations is certainly a step in the right direction. 
Reforming Dublin has the capacity to curtail mafia spending enough to 
disincentivize the widespread, systematic, and calculated exploitation of the 
refugee crisis. Eliminating the requirement that asylum seekers apply for asy-
lum in the first country in which they entered the EU, coupled with the suspen-
sion or elimination of Dublin transfers, will not only reduce mafia profits, but 
will also have the desirable outcome of improving asylum policy in Europe 
generally. By ensuring that asylum seekers do not become initially trapped, 
delayed in procedural limbo, or sent back to the mafia-controlled reception 
centers, the proposed changes to Dublin will minimize profit generating while 
also alleviating many of the human rights-related problems that have arisen as 
a result of mafia activity in Italy. Further, the reforms will ideally result in a 
more consistent, synchronized asylum policy across the EU by distributing 
applications more evenly and accounting for differences in available resources 
among member nations. 
These outcomes are not only crucial to promoting political, economic, and 
social stability in Italy, Europe, and the international community, but are also in 
the best interests of the migrant and refugee populations affected who ultimately 
hope to find security, safety, and a new start within Europe’s borders. 
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